http-equiv='refresh'/> Consfearacynewz: Homeland Defense/RAID/FEMA/National Security Council/1997

Sunday, July 8, 2012

Homeland Defense/RAID/FEMA/National Security Council/1997

As we all know the U.S. Army now has an active military force operating within the U.S.

Brigade homeland tours start Oct. 1

While looking into the flu I came across a base in Missouri which has had a series of meningitis outbreaks...Fort Leonard Wood.  Looking into the base a little lead me to some interesting info on the military and the feds operating jointly inside the US.  I did a search and don't think this article has been posted on the forum, so I'm going to post the entire piece and the link.

Military Support Detachment (RAID): The tip of the military spear
 Engineer ,  Apr 1999   by Gonzales, Kenneth 

A new unit is standing up at Fort Leonard Wood-the 7th Military Support Detachment (MSD) Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID). Like its nine counterparts one in each Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) region-it has a mandate. Authorized and funded in the FY99 defense bill, it must be manned; equipped, trained, certified, and validated fully mission capable no later than 5 January 2000. Ambitious as this may seem, its fielding is very much in progress.

Because the RAID detachments are so new and their concept-to-fielding process transcends standard procedures for introducing new force structure, they are already the subject of much misinformation. This article explains some of the background that led to their establishment, how the RAID detachments are manned and equipped, and what they are designed to do. I also briefly describe the 7th MSD (RAID) relationships with the Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) and the Total Army Center of Excellence for Homeland Defense initiatives at Fort Leonard Wood.


Our nation's awareness of the threat from terrorist acts and incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been mounting throughout the 1990s. Events such as the bombings at the New York City World Trade Center, the Tokyo subway, and the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City accelerated the need to take action. In June 1995, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 39. It provides guidance for distinguishing between "consequence management" and "crisis management" and establishes specific objectives and accountability for federal agencies. The directive's objectives include deterring, defeating, and responding to all terrorist attacks on our territory and managing the consequences of such attacks.

Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation contained in the FY97 defense bill directed the Secretary of Defense to more fully engage the military in measures to protect our nation from terrorist attacks involving WMD. Accordingly, the Department of Defense is providing for training, expert advice and assistance, loan of equipment, rapid response capability, and the use of the National Guard and other elements of the Reserve Components.

In May 1997, the National Security Council released The National Security Strategy for a New Century. Our nation's security planners recognized that "...because of our dominance in the conventional military arena, adversaries who challenge the United States are likely to do so using asymmetrical means such as weapons of mass destruction, information operations, or terrorism." A few months later, the Secretary of Defense released an updated National Military Strategy (October 1997). It provided additional insight into an acknowledged vulnerability: "...terrorism, the use or threatened use of WMD... have the potential to threaten the U.S. homeland and population directly and to deny us access to critical overseas infrastructure."

Other reports since then from the Defense Science Board, Foss-Downing Commission (CB 2010), and Quadrennial Defense Review also acknowledged the terrorist threat. Among the conclusions reached by these separate studies was one common recommendation: greater use of the National Guard and other elements of the Reserve Components.

In response to these findings and recommendations, the Department of Defense established a special committee to investigate how to better integrate National Guard/Reserve Component WMD capabilities to enhance military response to civil authorities. Designated the 'Tiger Team," its charter was straightforward: construct a complete model for integrating the Reserve Components into a consequence management response for domestic terrorist incidents involving WMD.


Among recommendations posed by the Tiger Team's early 1998 report was the establishment of a rapid assessment and initial detection capability in the National Guard. The original recommendation called for 54 teams (one for each state, territory, and Washington, D.C.). The manning document provided for 44 personnel: 22 fulltime (Active Guard/Reserve) and 22 part-time (traditional or mobilization-day guardsmen). These teams were to be trained and equipped to standards compatible with the civilian "first responders" (fire, police, emergency medical, and hazardous materials) they were designed to support.

Despite time, budgetary, and legislative obstacles, the Tiger Team's recommendation became a reality when the 1999 defense bill was signed. Final legislation, however, reduced the number of National Guard teams from 54 to 10 (one for each of the 10 FEMA regions) and provided for only 22 full-time Active Guard/Reserve personnel (no traditional guardsmen). Figure 1 shows the 10 FEMA regions and the MSD (RAID) states.


The purpose of MSD (RAID) is multifaceted. From the time of notification, units are designed to deploy within 4 hours to the site of a suspected terrorist incident within the FEMA region they support. The RAID detachments operate in direct support of civilian first responders. The local agency head that has authority over the incident response is referred to as the incident commander. In terrorist incidents characterized by explosive devices, fires, hazardous materials, etc., the incident commander is normally the local civilian fire chief The RAID detachments, in direct support of incident commanders, help first responders identify and assess the nature of an attack and determine the presence and type of nuclear, chemical, biological and/or radiological (NBCR) contamination. The detachments are trained and equipped to provide on-scene medical and technical advice to incident commanders and have the knowledge and capability to reach back for follow-on state, federal, and military assets. Figure 2 shows the MSD (RAID) mission statement.

The MSD (RAID) 22-man table of distribution and allowances provides for six subteams: command and control, operations, communications, administration/logistics, medical, and survey. Figure 3 depicts how the RAID detachments are structured. All positions may be filled by either Army or Air National Guard personnel.

Command and Control Team

The command and control team oversees the MSD (RAID), advises the incident commander on appropriate responses to WMD incidents, and facilitates follow-on support. The team also coordinates all public affairs issues for the MSD (RAID).

Operations Team

The operations team conducts planning, hazard modeling, and interagency coordination and schedules individual and collective training for MSD (RAID) personnel. The team helps plan and conduct interagency exercises, conducts force protection and liaison functions, and coordinates MSD (RAID) sustainment training.

Communications Team

The communications team supports the technical needs of the MSD (RAID). It provides day-to-day communications (internal and external voice and data networks) while the RAID detachment is at home station. Once mobilized, it supports team communications en route to an incident site. Upon arrival at the incident site, the communications team keeps the MSD (RAID) commander in touch with the incident commander and other reach-back support as needed.

Because of the civil-military implications of this team, MSD (RAID) communications equipment appears more civilian than military. Civilian fire, police, and emergency medical service departments frequently employ 800/900 MHz two-way radio communications systems. HF/UHF/ VHF systems frequently are used to link military and federal agencies. Pagers, cellular telephones, and tactical satellite voice and data telecommunications systems supplement the radio-based systems that provide communications power to the MSD (RAID) commander and the supported incident commander.

Administration/Logistics Team

The administration/logistics team procures, stores, accounts for and maintains all MSD (RAID) equipment. It also provides traditional administrative and personnel functions common to all units. The challenges of its support are magnified by the unique requirements of the unit. The communications systems described above are representative of the unusual and nonstandard military character of the MSD (RAID). Transportation and protective gear are other examples of the unique nature of this unit. Its vehicles are nonstandard-General Services Administration vans and sport utility models. While all team members are issued personal protective equipment and carry M40 masks, the survey team is trained to operate in Level A suits (spacesuittype outer garments with self-contained breathing apparatus).

Medical Team

The medical team advises the incident commander of health and medical implications for personnel in areas affected by a WMD incident. Team members are trained and resourced to coordinate with local, state, and federal healthcare officials and agencies for follow-on support as needed. The medical team provides basic medical care for MSD (RAID) members and conducts physical assessments before and after survey team members enter potentially contaminated WMD incident sites.

Survey Team

The survey team conducts nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological (NBCR) surveys at a WMD incident site, as directed by the MSD (RAID) commander. Survey team members are at the heart of the MSD (RAID) weapons-ofmass-destruction incident response. They are trained and equipped to enter the "hot zone," obtain samples of possible NBCR contaminants, and monitor local contamination levels. They are equipped with the latest technology for detecting and assessing possible contaminants. In addition to familiar military detection and monitoring equipment, the survey team brings sophisticated diagnostic tools like the gas chromatograph and mass spectrometer to the incident commander. Having these devices available is critical to the unique mission of the MSD (RAID) and its support to civilian authorities.

Command and Control

Operationally, the MSD (RAID) falls under the command and control of the adjutant general of the state to which it is assigned. As a Title 32 National Guard asset, its deployment to support civilian authorities during a WMD incident is similar to other state disaster deployments in which the National Guard has been involved for many years.

Recognition of the long-standing relationship between the National Guard and civilian authorities was an influencing factor in deciding where to place the MSD (RAID) capability. Deployment of the detachments to other states is coordinated through FEMA. In those circumstances, the MSD (RAID) falls under the command and control of the receiving adjutant general, while remaining in direct support of the local incident commander. Many other doctrinal, training, equipment, evaluation, and deployment considerations for MSD (RAID) are still being developed.

Stationing the 7th MSD (RAID) at Fort Leonard Wood offers it some advantages that the other detachments won't enjoy. During FY99, the Army's Chemical and Military Police Schools will join the engineers as co-tenants of Fort Leonard Wood. While the dynamics of this union may take years to fully realize, the 7th MSD (RAID) will reap some immediate benefits. Subject matter expertise available in the three schools will enable the 7th MSD (RAID) to lead in doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS) issues affecting its mission.

The advantage works both ways. Discussions with senior members of the school staffs reveal that they already see benefits for their students, battle lab experiments, facilities employment, leader development, and training by having a RAID detachment in their own backyard. Designated the Maneuver Support Center and established to leverage the synergistic impact of all three schools, Fort Leonard Wood is a showcase for TRADOC's reorganization initiative around battlefield functions. (See Engineer, April 1998). Through its stationing at the MANSCEN, the 7th MSD (RAID) benefits from this consolidation. No other installation brings together the subject matter experts, training opportunities, and battle lab facilities as well as Fort Leonard Wood.

Threat Response

In homeland defense and Department of Defense initiatives to provide for the defense of our nation, the MSD (RAID) is the tip of the military spear in responding to incidents involving WMD. In fact, while our leaders determine how to bring all strategic assets into coordinated alignment (information operations, national missile defense, special operations forces, etc.), the MSD (RAID) stands out as the military's newest and most visible capability for responding to the threat of domestic terrorism.

The designation of MANSCEN as the Total Army Center of Excellence for Homeland Defense training, experimentation, and force integration is a given. At MANSCEN, troops will train to detect, defend against, and decontaminate NBCR weapons. Soldiers will manage the treatment and evacuation of casualties and assist with the quarantine of affected areas and personnel. Proponent responsibilities of the Chemical, Military Police and Engineer Schools (the MANSCEN) are to respond to NBCR contamination, counter the threat of terrorism, protect the force, secure projection platforms, and ensure continuity of critical infrastructure. The physical and intellectual capital invested in Fort Leonard Wood today will contribute to the Total Army's success in executing homeland defense missions. Stationing the 7th MSD (RAID) at Fort Leonard Wood is part of that investment.


The requirement for a rapid assessment and initial detection capability was documented by numerous studies and technical working groups. Hence, the establishment of the Military Support Detachment (RAID). Stationed in the 10 FEMA regions of the United States, these National Guard detachments will be designed, trained, and equipped to detect and assess NBCR contamination resulting from terrorist acts involving weapons of mass destruction. The MSD (RAID) will augment civilian authorities with technical capabilities beyond those normally found among first responders.

If called on to respond to a WMD incident, an MSD (RAID) deploys to support civilian authorities as the initial military response element on the scene. For the Department of Defense, the National Guard's MSD (RAID) capability is the tip of the military spear. For Fort Leonard Wood, the Maneuver Support Center, and the Total Army Center of Excellence for Homeland Defense, the 7th MSD (RAID) is a unique tenant activity and a viable partner for the future

Colonel Gonzales is director of plans, operations, and training for the Missouri National Guard. He commanded the 175th Military Police Battalion and has served at the National Guard Bureau in Washington, D.C. COL Gonzales holds a master's degree in education and is a graduate of the Army War College
Presidential Decision Directive 39

Purpose. To provide an unclassified synopsis of the U.S. national policy on terrorism as laid out in Presidential Decision Directive-39 (PDD-39).

Background. On June 21, 1995, the President signed PDD-39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism. This classified document laid out the national policy and assigned specific missions to designated Federal Departments and agencies. This unclassified synopsis is provided to enable Federal, State, and local emergency response and Consequence Management personnel without appropriate security clearances to have a basic understanding of the provisions of PDD-39.

PDD-39 validates and reaffirms existing Federal Lead Agency responsibilities for counterterrorism, which are assigned to the Department of Justice (DOJ), as delegated to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for threats or acts of terrorism within the United States. The FBI as the lead for Crisis Management will involve only those Federal agencies required and designated in classified documents. The Directive further states that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), with the support of all agencies in the Federal Response Plan (FRP), will support the FBI in Washington, DC, and on scene until the Attorney General transfers Lead Agency to FEMA. FEMA retains responsibility for Consequence Management throughout the Federal response.

Definitions. Crisis Management includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the Federal Government to prevent and respond to acts of terrorism; State and local governments provide assistance as required. Crisis management is predominantly a law enforcement response.

Consequence Management includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. The laws of the United States assign primary authority to the States to respond to the consequences of terrorism; the Federal Government provides assistance as required.

U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism

General. Terrorism is both a threat to our national security as well as a criminal act. The Administration has stated that it is the policy of the United States to use all appropriate means to deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist attacks on our territory and resources, both with people and facilities, wherever they occur. In support of these efforts, the United States will:

    * Employ efforts to deter, preempt, apprehend, and prosecute terrorists.
    * Work closely with other governments to carry out counterterrorism policy and combat terrorist threats against them.
    * Identify sponsors of terrorists, isolate them, and ensure they pay for their actions.
    * Make no concessions to terrorists.

Measures to Combat Terrorism. To ensure that the United States is prepared to combat terrorism in all of its forms, a number of measures have been directed. These include reducing vulnerabilities to terrorism, deterring and responding to terrorist attacks, and having capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons, including those of mass destruction.

a. Reduce Vulnerabilities. In order to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorism, both at home and abroad, all departmental/agency heads have been directed to ensure that their personnel and facilities are fully protected against terrorism. Specific efforts that will be conducted to ensure our security against terrorist attacks include the following

    * Review the vulnerability of government facilities and critical national infrastructure.
    * Expand the program of counterterrorism.
    * Reduce vulnerabilities affecting civilian personnel/facilities abroad and military personnel/facilities.
    * Exclude/deport persons who pose a terrorist threat.
    * Prevent unlawful traffic in firearms and explosives and protect the President and other officials against terrorist attack.
    * Reduce U.S. vulnerabilities to international terrorism through intelligence collection/ analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action.

b. Deter. To deter terrorism, it is necessary to provide a clear public position that our policies will not be affected by terrorist acts and we will vigorously deal with terrorists/sponsors to reduce terrorist capabilities and support. In this regard, we must make it clear that we will not allow terrorism to succeed and that the pursuit, arrest, and prosecution of terrorists are of the highest priority. Our goals include the disruption of terrorist sponsored activity, including termination of financial support, arrest and punishment of terrorists as criminals, application of U.S. laws and new legislation to prevent terrorist groups from operating in the United States, and application of extraterritorial statutes to counter acts of terrorism and apprehend terrorists outside of the United States. The return of terrorists overseas who are wanted for violation of U.S. law is of the highest priority and a central issue in bilateral relations with any state that harbors or assists them.

c. Respond. To respond to terrorism, we must have a rapid and decisive capability to protect Americans, defeat or arrest terrorists, respond against terrorist sponsors, and provide relief to the victims of terrorists. The goal during the immediate response phase of an incident is to terminate terrorist attacks, so the terrorists do not accomplish their objectives or maintain their freedom, while seeking to minimize damage and loss of life and provide emergency assistance. After an incident has occurred, a rapidly deployable interagency Emergency Support Team (EST) will provide required capabilities on scene: a Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) for foreign incidents, and a Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) for domestic incidents. DEST membership will be limited to those agencies required to respond to the specific incident. Both teams will include elements for specific types of incidents such as nuclear, chemical, and biological threats.

The Director, FEMA will ensure that the FRP is adequate for Consequence Management activities in response to terrorist attacks against large U.S. populations, including those where weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are involved. FEMA will also ensure that State response plans and capabilities are adequate and tested. FEMA, supported by all FRP signatories, will assume the Lead Agency role for consequence management in Washington, DC, and on scene. If large-scale casualties and infrastructure damage occur, the President may appoint a Personal Representative for Consequence Management as the on-scene Federal authority during recovery. A roster of senior and former government officials willing to perform these functions will be created, and the rostered individuals will be provided training and information necessary to allow themselves to be called on short notice.

Agencies will bear the cost of their participation in terrorist incidents and counter-terrorist operations, unless otherwise directed.

d. NBC Consequence Management. The development of effective capabilities for preventing and managing the consequence of terrorist use of NBC materials or weapons is of the highest priority. Terrorist acquisition of WMD is not acceptable, and there is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of such materials/weapons or removing the capability.

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